Quote:I doubt it.  There are quite a number of reasons, but three main ones.  Perhaps most important we are only now coming out of isolation and trying as a central government to regain control of two regions on the Island of Nashwa.  Work in progress.
 
Second, our trading does not have to go through Migrant’s Pass. Well, that is not quite true; we do have a seven hundred year old arrangement with a nation for sale of its rather upscale sports utility vehicles but they ship to us and may or may not go through Migrant’s Pass to get to us.  In any event, insisting on rights we do not use has not become important to us, a small weak nation.
 
And third, we have been on both sides of the issue. Supporting those insisting they were arbiters of everything and now against claiming to own international waters.  So our current opinion is not one anyone is seeking to know.
 
We do nonetheless support the call of Istalia for an international conference for resolving issues connected to Migrant’s Pass peacefully.

Quote:First, I want to acknowledge the leadership of former Finance Minister Faisal Abu Saq in beginning the work on setting our policy for the structure of our oil extraction business.
 
Second, I also want to acknowledge this is essentially the structure set in place 700 year ago by the Free Radical Party when it held power.
 
The petroleum reserves of Jumhuriat al-Badara were nationalized by the preceding regime; accordingly, all the oil is currently owned by the Sovereign People of Badara. All. Extraction and sale of that petroleum will be again managed by the state owned Petroleum Development of Badara (PDB) and overseen by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
What will PDB do?  Primarily three things.  With an effect on a fourth.  It will lease the right to extract oil to citizens and businesses of Jumhuriat al-Badara. Only. We do expect Majatran Leasing Corporation (MLC) to go back into business.  Should the lessees actually produce oil, they will pay  royalties to PDB.
 
Second, leasing and royalty fees will be held in a fund in Central Bank drawing interest which ultimately guarantees the citizens’ government pension funds and medical benefit funds to aid with shortfalls and cushion strain on having enough funds for guaranteed benefits.
 
Third, PDB will assume control and continue operating many of the nationalized  oil fields currently in use. Why?  To insure domestic needs for oil and natural gas are not interrupted.
 
Fourth, when the international petroleum market takes an unfortunate turn, PDB can increase or decrease production as necessary to offset changes.
 
We are currently producing about 5 ½ mm barrels a day. This is less than half of what we produced at our peak and less than a third of what our experts say we could produce.  Our current thinking is about 8 million barrels a day will not affect the international price, and we will be conducting our leasing and monitoring with this in mind.
 
Those citizens and businesses of ours who lease the right to extract may employ others including foreign interests to provide expertise and even do extraction. And they may sell it paying the royalties to PDB of course.
 
We expect the former owners of Majatran Refining Company (MRC) to again take control of that moribund business in Al’Buqiyaa and produce refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. We understand Qat Oil Services (QOS) is returning to Jumhuriat al-Badata and will likely do much of the actual exploring and extracting for lessees.  The QOS oil fleet will also likely do much of the sea transport of crude oil, liquefied natural gas and refined petroleum products.

The leasing and royalty fees will not be exorbitant but will provide steady income to be used for the benefit of all the Sovereign People.  
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Quote:We have made a  good start. We moved 10 frigates into the harbor and landed two motorized infantry divisions in the city supported by some tanks, helicopters, fighter bombers and subsonic ground support gunships. These forces  proceeded to reoccupy the forts and airfields abandoned some years ago.
 
The Free State Brigade forces fled north along the coast  with very little resistance. We have reintroduced National Police backed by heavily armed Special Security forces (SSF) and Internal Security Unit (ISU) secret police in the city and called on the Muhafaza government to begin operating again independent of the Free State Brigade.
 
Disuyana is a town in the mountains which is the headquarters of the Free State Brigade. Its general modus operandi is for contingents to go from Disuyana to other communities at regular intervals to extort funds from local businesses and wealthy citizens and collect supplies.
 
The city of Misul is south of Al’Buqiyaa in the interior. One battalion of our tanks supported by a squadron of helicopters and followed by two brigades of motorized infantry headed down the road to Misul, where thanks to sophisticated intelligence from Lodamun, we knew a sizeable contingent of the Free State Brigade was collecting “taxes” or “tribute.” Our swift descent on Al’Buqiyaa and the Free State Brigade retreat north left them isolated.
 
Sufficiently isolated that we surrounded them on three sides. It seemed unlikely they would retreat south into Dufazi held territory in Al’Salmania Muhafaza since the Dufazi had no use for non Abadi common criminals who were considerably less well armed than they were.
 
We did not really want to have to take a chance on civilian casualties if shooting our way into Misul was necessary, so we initiated peace talks.  They were interested and we came to mutually agreeable terms.  They could leave with no loot and no weaponry.  Not strictly speaking the usual treatment of gangsters,  but we took Misul without killing innocent bystanders, were able to return a considerable hoard of ill gotten gains to more or less its rightful owners, establish National Police control and start the normal government functions to resume.
 
Thanks again to Lodamun’s intelligence we know where the Free State Brigade still operates.  What the ISU is hearing is they will contract operations to shorter and shorter excursions from Disuyana to extract revenue continuing them as long as feasible.  ISU believes many will then disperse and return to their professions as bouncers, body guards, armed robbers, burglars, and operatives of neighborhood protection rackets.  We shall see.

Quote:Certainly think so. The Istalian Emperor Alessandro V and Minister Secretary of State Annalisa Saragat were welcomed by the whole Sovereign People of Jumhuriat al-Badara. All of us want to renew the close friendly ties we once had.  They met with Chsancellor Khalifi al-Qassem and me for discussions of working together on trade, security and energy.
 
A truly positive development has been the Istalian National Congress re-establishng all civil, political and cultural protections for the Majatran Minority in Istalia  including the remaining limitations on military service. We are very aware this was not an easy step for them.
 
We have also worked out an arrangement which should greatly enhance the energy security of Istalia.  As you know all our oil reserves belong to the Sovereign People of Jumhuriat al-Badara. They are exploited by the state owned corporation Petroleum Development of Badara (PDB) which extracts and sells crude oil, leases drilling and exploitation rights to individuals and businesses that are Badaran subject to royalties.
 
The arrangement made allows Istalian petroleum businesses to buy crude oil from PDB, oil reserve lessees, and companies such as Qat Oil Services (QOS) that does actual exploration, drilling, extraction and marketing for a great many lessees.  Further Istalian businesses may purchase refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas from Majatran Refining Company.  Also, its oil drilling and marketing companies may sell their services to oil reserve lessees.
 
Most important, to the extent the domestic petroleum and natural gas needs of Istallia are not met by access as heretofore described, PDB will insure that these oil and natural gas needs are supplied in preference to all others except our own domestic demands which are quite modest since we are a quite small country.
 
The royalties and lease rental fee profits  go into a fund to insure the health, retirement and other benefits due our citizenry are fully funded; the health of this fund is assured by this arrangement.
 
We have not forgotten that when we were reentering the petroleum business 800 years ago, it was Istalia’s petroleum exploiters tat provided the expertise for us to get in the game.  We are very glad for our renewed economic partnership.

Quote:Yes it will be gradual, but yes. The BDR is just of too little value. It is truth be told sort of a despised baby currency.  We are not going to immediately or necessarily entirely stop using it, but Central Bank will remove portions from circulation and replace BDR with Dinars. This has been  authorized by the Majlis. Central Bank will set an official exchange rate and adjust regularly.
 
 As we begin the Badaran Dinar will be worth 50 BDR. However the rate of exchange of both will float, and at any given removal the current official exchange rate will be used for conversion.
 
Individuals will be able to exchange BDR for Dinars at most banks and at special locations established by Central Bank. Our citizenry will be encouraged to exchange BDR for Dinars.  Much of the bulk conversion will be for taxes collected which have been assigned as appropriated funds to Ministry accounts.
 
Other currencies may be exchanged for Dinars as well. The largest source of bulk exchange of foreign currencies will be the royalties and crude oil sales payable to the state owned Petroleum Development Company (PDB).
 
Two things are quite likely.  The Majlis may in future authorize new Dinars to be issued and, when the BDR actually becomes rare, it is probable a coin, the fulu in point of fact, representing a portion of a Dinar could be issued as well.

Quote:Our plan was for the military to seize and occupy the naval base, airfields and forts in and around Ras al-Ulima. Which they did without opposition.  We then restored police control using National Police. Since then the Muhafaza Government and the municipal government have returned to functioning normally albeit within Ras al-Ulima and adjacent areas.
 
The heavily armed Special Security Forces (SSF) including their helicopter gunships of the Interior Ministry then moved into the Ports of Sutan and Kharma. Dufazi representatives and units withdrew as they advanced.
 
At this juncture local police and National Police, national government offices, together with the municipal and Al’Salmania  Muhaza governments are functioning in much of Al’ Salmania. 
 
But not all. In the mountains and hills around Bab al-Mira, the paramilitary units of Abadi cleric Moqtada al-Dufaz (the Dufazi) are entrenched, his religious thought police are hard at work, and he is in control. This according to military intelligence from Lodamun and the Internal Security Unit (ISU) of the Interior Ministry.
 
I have interesting news however from Ivrahim Duqaq, General Director of Intelligence (GIS).  His operatives are in contact with Moqtada al-Dufaz who claims he wants to talk rather than fight. GIS has assured him I am contacting the Ministerial Presidium recommending we agree to a meeting that includes Justice Minister Bashir ibn Ortoq.
 
Too soon to get overly hopeful, but we  may be on the way to a negotiated end to anarchy in Al’salmania.

Quote:There are a number of reasons. Seriously.  You are quite correct it could be done.  The Dufazi are well armed for a paramilitary force, but we do have the military power to do so even in our somewhat degraded condition.  But taking Bab al-Mira from the Dufazi will cause civilian casualties.  We know we may have to do it. They know we know we may have to do it.  But there is no reason that should be our first choice.
 
The General Intelligence Security Directorate (GIS) believes  Moqtada al-Dufaz wants to talk.  We know the GIS is no Kafuri GID, after all who is, but we think this report is genuine and is worth a try.
 
Which brings up a fundamental question.  Do we really want the Dufazi gone?  Certainly we want the religious thought police they protect gone; much of their activity is simply indulging in brutality as common criminals.  And we want the cleric himself to cease advocating religious murder and mutilation in the name of religion. 
 
But the Dufazi itself. At times being in a paramilitary unit or forming one has been a crime and may be again.  Illegally obtaining weaponry from the military through bribery or outright theft is certainly a crime. But being in the Dufazi, in and of itself, not so much.
 
Further, The Ahmadi State in Majatra (ASIM),  the Ahmadi State in Kafuristan (ASIK) and other extremists are out there ready to recruit if we eliminate the Dufazi.  Currently Moqtada Al-Dufaz completely dominates the Abadi armed opposition to the government. Completely.       
And our Israi population has so recoiled from the Israi foreign invasion from throughout Terra intent on terrorism and destruction several centuries ago  that is not all susceptible for the time being.
 
Further, the Abadi are a sizeable minority who are not generally Dufazi, but the Abadi as a whole do not want them massacred or imprisoned but left alone.
 
So if they want to talk, we’ll talk.  Maybe we can come to terms.