Lodamun

[imperialpearl]

Drawing significant inspiration from the broad review which had been initiated within the Kalistani Armed Forces, President William Stedman, via an executive order, prompted the creation of the Defence Review Board (DRB), an standing body within the Department of Defence ecosystem tasked with conducting comprehensive reviews into the structure, readiness and future requirements of the Lodamese Armed Forces. Comprised of an eight-member group of experts, primarily former high-ranking commanders and officials within the Lodamese Armed Forces, the DRB led by Commandant of the Lodamese Army War College Lt. General Ervin Hartman, had been tasked to conduct a broad, yet meticulous review of the Lodamese Armed Forces’ current structure, offensive posture and capabilities against the backdrop of numerous geopolitical challenges, both past and present, with the intent of providing recommendations the DoD and the OCCC (Office of the Chairman of the Combined Chiefs) shy of a masterplan to ensure the LAF remains a capable combat force going into the future notwithstanding financial, administrative and structural challenges. In the Board’s inaugural meeting, which had been partially publicised, Lt. Gen. Hartman stated that the Lodamese Armed Forces in the future had to be one which remained ever conscious of the constraints of public finances. “Throughout the years, it has been easy for one to wish away our nation’s otherwise exorbitant defence spending,” Hartman remarked, “but the reality is that our priorities and interests globally compel vigilance and the ability to reach any threat, anywhere. That ultimately comes at a price that is rarely accounted for. What we have been tasked with doing is ensuring that every dollar spent is tied directly to capability, efficiency and deterrence.” Having been given six months to report on their findings and recommendations, the DRB has released unclassified versions of its review coined the “National Defence Review 5600-5700”. The report’s contents, which are divided among the various branches of the Armed Forces, are discussed as follows:

Despite being the largest and most historically entrenched branch of the Armed Forces, the Lodamese Army, when compared to the other branches (Commonwealth Guard, Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force), remains the least impacted by the past century of modernisation efforts. When the Lodamese Navy underwent its dramatic transformation towards expeditionary warfare, the Lodamese Army remained largely in stasis. The report highlighted that although the army had maintained a strong reputation for discipline, training and professionalism, as had been demonstrated in its numerous engagements with Likatonian forces in the previous Lodamese-Likatonian War, much of its force posture is still designed to fight the large-scale conventional wars reminiscent of that era. The report goes to extreme lengths to highlight the pitfalls of the failure of defence planners in the immediate aftermath of the conflict to conduct an independent review of the Lodamese Army and its capabilities, recognising that the conflict had, in some instances, reaffirmed whilst in other instances invalidated doctrine and thinking up to that point. Although it did not deride the existence of the armoured formations, mechanised infantry formations and armoured scout formations, it nonetheless recognised that these units in their current scale represented an unsustainable drain on the national budget. To that end, the report recommended a downsizing of the Lodamese Army from its current force composition of around 300,000 active service personnel to around 180,000. In its basic terms, the report argued that a smaller force is by its very nature easier to modernise. “As opposed to spreading Lodamun’s defence budget (which is capped at 400 billion LOD) across the already bloated Lodamese Army and Commonwealth Guard, this reduction provides the LAF with a unique opportunity to truly focus on enhancing its lethality with respect to systems and training,” the report noted.

It can be reasonably argued that much of the modernisation efforts of the earlier quarter of the century had favoured the Lodamese Coast Guard. From its dramatic expansion from green water to blue water operations, the inception of Operation Barracuda, and its establishment and subsequent recognition as a premier naval force, the Lodamese Coast Guard has, compared to the other branches, been highly favoured. This ‘favouritism’ ought not to be viewed as the excesses of political manoeuvring at the time, but instead, as the report contends, a strategic imperative driven by the geopolitics of the time. Prior to the Lodamese Coast Guard’s Modernisation Programme, much of Lodamun’s economic exclusion zone (EEZ) had been largely patrolled by ageing units from the then critically under-equipped Lodamese Navy. It had been recognised at the time that in the absence of a clear Lodamese presence on its national borders and within its immediate environment, the nation might be passed over by the more powerful, established nations. Operation Barracuda, the Coast Guard’s behemoth initiative to patrol the entirety of the Seleyan continent, represented a major step forward for Lodamun geopolitically. Yet despite its legacy in establishing Lodamun as the competent and ‘powerful’ sea-fearing nation it is today, the Lodamese Coast Guard remains a shell of its former self. The report notes that the decision to expand Operation Barracuda to encompass the entire Seleyan continent led to a crisis within the branch, wherein, given the limitations of its fleet, the LCG became significantly over-extended and thus became increasingly dependent on support from the Lodamese Navy, which had finally gained a solid footing. This, according to the report, when coupled with the fact that much of the Coast Guard’s fleet is ageing once more, presents added complexity to its otherwise clear mandate. To that end, the report recommended that Operation Barracuda be dramatically altered to focus primarily on Northern Seleya, extending from the Mad Dog and Anantonese Oceans to the Artanian and Schismatic Seas. It noted that the LCG had no real interests in patrolling the waters south of the Aldegar Cana,l recognising its ‘more important’ taskings in the North. Additionally, it recommended a new shipbuilding programme to expand Domestic Security Cutters and OPVs for potential tasking in the Schismatic and Anantonese Oceans.

As the most fortunate but also the most active branch of the Lodamese Armed Forces, the report provides the branch much of the introductory details. It notes that given the importance of maritime trade to the continuity of the Lodamese economy, particularly the free and unfettered access to the various seas and oceans enjoyed by the Harrington Company and that institution’s importance to Lodamun, the attention given to the navy was in every sense ‘warranted’. From its high-intensity engagements in the Migrant’s Pass to the ever-evolving surveillance network slowly being built by the BNI (Bureau of Naval Intelligence), the report articulated the otherwise spirited history of the Lodamese Navy. Despite this, it recognises that there is nonetheless room for change. Of particular concern, the report highlighted the current expenditure on what it deemed “large ocean-going ships”, primarily the four carriers to be constructed for the Lodamese Navy. The formal commissioning of the LCS-Kensington, the nation’s first supercarrier, represented a major leap forward in capability for Lodamun, granting it the ability to project immense ‘power’ into any region throughout the world. Despite this, budgetary limitations have sparked significant debate within the DoD as to the feasibility of the nation fielding four supercarriers. Ultimately, the report called for the scrapping of advanced plans for the construction of four carriers, instead settling on three. Beyond this, the report noted that the otherwise high-stakes deployment of EAGs (Expeditionary Action Groups) to areas of significant tension, particularly the Migrant’s Pass, has led to conversations related to whether the current force structure within the region, one which favours the deployment of littoral combat ships to the region and areas similar to it, ought to be the way forward. The report concurred with these sentiments, as it argued that the costly deployment of amphibious assault ships and supporting equipment would eventually become unsustainable, especially given the fact that said EAGs do not remain in ‘theatre’ for extended durations, undergoing active operations, which may make such deployments more economically feasible. To that end, it recommended that EAGs primarily operate within those areas where the Lodamese Navy is certain to remain for extended periods, thus avoiding the “stop and start” deployments which have become emblematic of EAG movements.